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0:00 The knowledge of how human cognition systems work and how they're evolved has led to a lot of misconceptions 0:06 and over simplifications in human performance. 0:11 And miscalibration of how humans contribute to the system and system performance can be problematic. 0:19 And so it's important that you actually understand how humans do what they do so 0:25 you can actually support their work. 0:28 That's Dr. Cynthia Knoll, talking about a scientific discipline important to mission success. 0:33 It's called Human Factors, and it's about how people interact with the systems they design, build, and operate. 0:40 As the NASA Technical Fellow for Human Factors, 0:42 Dr. Knoll provides technical leadership and expertise on how human capabilities 0:47 and performance are considered across the agency. 0:50 Let's dive in on this episode of Small Steps Giant Leaps. 1:05 Welcome to Small Steps Giant Leaps, the podcast from NASA's Academy of Program, Project, 1:10 and Engineering Leadership, or APPLE. 1:12 I'm your host, Andrés Almeida. 1:14 I'm talking with Dr. Cynthia Noll, who's joining us from NASA's Ames Research Center in Silicon Valley. 1:19 Hi, Cynthia. Thanks for joining us. 1:22 Well, great to be here. 1:23 Can you tell us a bit more about your role and what you do at NASA? 1:26 Yes, I'm the technical fellow for human factors at the NASA Engineering and Safety Center. 1:32 The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was formed after the Columbia accident 1:35 to create a ready team that's independent of programs and projects and has deep expertise. 1:43 And what we deliver is robust understanding of risk and possible risk mitigations for mission safety 1:50 and success for any project or program mission across all of NASA. 1:55 There are 21 different disciplines that have a technical fellow. 2:01 And my job as a technical fellow is to have insight into how human factors is used 2:07 or not used across all missions, not just human spaceflight, but aeronautics, science missions, 2:15 technology developments, whatever. 2:18 Now we don't get involved in everything because we're a limited size group and we work place where 2:25 we can influence risk and mission success. 2:29 So part of my job is just general insight, 2:32 because what comes to the NESC are questions or issues or concerns that approach might be wrong. 2:39 If a question comes in that might have human factors needs, 2:43 then I would find someone with the right expertise to be on that team. 2:48 Sometimes the questions are just general human factors questions, at which point I would lead the team. 2:53 But sometimes it's a it's a software development project, 2:56 but there's piece of it that human factors would have some influence in or 3:00 For example, we've looked at parachutes and part of the problems 3:04 with parachutes are actually just making them I'm just designing them and so the making them 3:10 of course is all done by hand And so we might do a human factors Investigation of the processes of procedures 3:16 and those kind of things related to manufacturing for example And you're talking about parachutes 3:21 for spacecraft landing on other worlds. 3:24 Yeah, basically well or landing back here 3:26 Orion comes down on the spacecraft dragging from sound on a space on a shoot 3:30 or yeah It could be shoots from Mars or some other place. 3:33 We've landed and so You want those things to work? 3:37 They usually have some sort of redundancy, 3:39 but not always it's really critical that you have all aspects of it so you can go through all your materials 3:46 and sizing and all that other kind of stuff but if there's a problem with manufacturing then 3:51 that could change your risk posture that it wouldn't come up in your analysis but it could come up in flight 3:58 so that would be a place where we could help and we might just decide that actually it's a brilliant process 4:04 and they're doing everything they can to control it or we might have recommendations. 4:09 And can you give a straightforward explanation of what human factors entails. 4:15 I'll try. To start with human factors is the scientific discipline. 4:20 It's based on the understanding of human capability as well as the interactions amidst humans 4:25 and all other elements of the system and mission. 4:29 So work, our discipline, is based on actually started with the understanding of human sensory systems 4:36 and the development of quantitative methods to describe them. 4:40 This work was actually done by some very famous physicists in the 19th century, 4:45 people you've probably heard of or studied. 4:47 Herman van Holz, Ernst Mach, are two of those people who actually not only did amazing discoveries related 4:55 to physics, but also developed methodologies to understand eyes, ears. 5:00 They discovered the vestibular system, which helps with balance. 5:03 Those techniques that they developed to do quantitative descriptions are still used today, 5:10 and they've been modified to deal with perception, not just sensation, and also how we think. 5:17 So human factors enhances mission safety, efficiency, success, 5:21 and all those kind of things by developing requirements, tools, processes, 5:25 and procedures to make the humans in the system successful. 5:28 The knowledge of how human cognition systems work and how they're evolved has led to a lot of misconceptions 5:34 and over-simplifications in human performance. 5:39 And miscalculation of how humans contribute to the system and system performance can be problematic. 5:47 And so it's important that you actually understand 5:50 how humans do what they do so you can actually support their work. 5:55 Is it important for human factors to be considered early in mission development? 5:59 Is that something you feel strongly about? 6:01 Very strongly. So the thing is when you're when you're conceiving a mission, 6:05 you're also conceiving what humans will do and what they won't do and so you can early on decide 6:12 that you're going to have a fully autonomous mission and 6:16 you can and you can design it without the 6:20 considering having human crew and Whether it's crew on the ground or crew in space. 6:26 That's a decision you can make But when you 6:29 then can't actually make everything work without real-time human decision making, 6:33 then you sort of have to step back and start all over again to figure out what their roles are really going 6:39 to be. So defining the human role and understanding what that role is and what you need to support 6:47 that role is really critical. 6:50 Was human factors as a discipline shaped by lessons learned? 6:53 Well, yeah, it might look like that. 6:57 But people were doing human factors and doing proactive human factors, starting as early as World War II. 7:04 So one of the big problems in World War II, 7:08 and it may have been problems before that, 7:11 but I guess probably with communication systems and all these other kinds of things, maybe it was less apparent, 7:16 but a big problem in World War II was just keeping planes in the air, 7:22 keeping them and repairing them when they came back. 7:25 And so maintenance became a huge issue. 7:28 And one of the problems with maintenance can be have you actually designed for maintainability. 7:33 So if you can't access the part of the engine you need to repair, then you have to actually take the engine off. 7:40 If you have to take the engine off, okay, 7:41 that plane is going to be in the repair area much longer than if you can repair it in place. 7:47 And so access becomes a very, very important thing. 7:52 So in the very, just after World War II, the field of human factors hadn't been named yet, 7:58 but people who had been involved in solving problems in World War II 8:02 for the military came from major universities on the East Coast, Harvard, 8:08 Penn, probably Yale, a few others. 8:10 And those people were then contracted to the government to develop guidance on how to do designs 8:17 for future mission systems. 8:20 And right in those design books, right in the lectures about those designs, 8:24 they started with, we need to design for the mission from the beginning. 8:29 So the first book that was a guidance book on how to write human factors, the first chapter is called The System. 8:39 The first bullet, it just says, all of our contractors, 8:45 as well as, this is written in the early 50s, all of our contractors, 8:49 as well as all of our in-house designers believe that you have to do designs starting at the system level. 8:57 So the notion of systems engineering is written as the first paragraph in this Human Factors book. 9:03 Then paragraph 1 .1 is entitled, The Human in the System, 9:08 and how you have to work on designing for all the roles the human's going to have in the system, 9:15 which could be engineer, like design engineer, it could be manufacturing, 9:21 it could be maintenance, it could be operations, it could be the crew member, it could be anyone, 9:29 and all of those people are valuable assets to the mission, and they all need to be counted for, 9:35 and you have to make sure that they have the information they need, the tools that they need, 9:40 and that they have everything else that they need, like access, for example. 9:45 And so, all of those things were actually talked about from the beginning in human factors. 9:49 Now, that doesn't necessarily mean that's the role we had in every system design once we said that's what we needed. 9:58 But it has been the mantra of human factors from the beginning that you actually had 10:06 to think about the design and that we weren't patching stuff that people forgot about, 10:11 that we were actually actively working on design. 10:14 And in the early 50s, people were asking questions, 10:18 all sorts of questions at all sorts of different levels about how you should do human factors. 10:24 So, one of the simple, simple questions is if you need somebody to respond to something really quickly, 10:32 like hit the off button or hit the escape button or something like that. 10:38 And the question was, how big does the button have to be so you can find it and hit it quickly? 10:46 And what they decided was that there was a trade-off between speed and accuracy. 10:52 and there was also a trade-off between size and distance. 10:57 So if the button was far away it had to be much bigger because you're just sort of trying to hit it 11:02 with your hand and so if it's small then you can't get it to it and 11:07 so there's actually a law called Fitts law named after a military human factors person from the 11:13 in this is early 50s where he actually described an equation if the buttons close like on your armrest 11:19 then it doesn't have to be very big, 11:21 but if it's going to be out in front of you on the front displays on, say, an airplane or wherever, 11:27 then it has to be big enough that you can just jam your hand in some direction and you won't miss it. 11:33 Now, we also said, but if you don't put a cover on it, they could accidentally bump into it. 11:38 And so, the other thing we said is important things, 11:41 like it's like aborts, should have a cover on them so you don't elbow into them accidentally because 11:46 you don't really want to do that unless it's intended. 11:50 So what you have to be going for, if it's far away, has to be big, 11:54 but it also has to be protected from just being bumped into accidentally. 11:59 You just made me think of an everyday example. 12:01 I go to a gym where there's a treadmill that has an emergency stop button in the center and 12:06 then moving my arms and I frequently hit it. 12:08 It's a large red button. 12:10 I frequently hit it and I stop. 12:11 Exactly. So what we would do in safety critical systems is we would put a cover on that or we might have, 12:19 you have to hit it twice or you have to do something so that it takes two actions instead of one. 12:25 But yes, I've been on those treadmills and I do realize that it's easy to hit them off, 12:31 but it's also good to have that there because if you were actually falling, you really do want that off. 12:36 And usually in a gym, those treadmills, the rows between them are not that far. 12:40 You could hit your head. 12:41 I'm the one behind you if you're not careful So it's good that it's there but you're right if it's too easy 12:47 to hit that's a problem And so those are actually how human factors thinks about 12:54 Everything okay, and so so that's the that's sort of the problem but people Then say oh I can think 13:02 like a human factors person. 13:03 I'm a human So there are lots of misconceptions about how humans actually work I bet there are. 13:10 What are some? 13:12 Well, so one of them is that humans are maybe sort of bad at probability 13:19 or understanding risk or making decisions that are evolved like that. 13:25 And so a long time ago, people interested in this topic actually did some research 13:30 and their subjects were either novices or actually experts in the field. 13:35 and one of the studies was done with medical decision-making and they gave a scenario 13:42 and half of the people got a scenario that was about a particular treatment for a disease 13:48 and it described this treatment and then it said the survival rate was 90 percent. 13:56 For another treatment they described this treatment, entirely different treatment, 14:02 and they described it in terms of its mortality rate, as opposed to its survival rate. 14:08 And they said its mortality rate was 10%. 14:12 And so they asked both novices and doctors, would you prefer treatment A or treatment B? 14:21 Now notice that 90 % survival and 10 % mortality are actually the same risk. 14:28 but almost everyone picked the survival. 14:33 And this was seen as being emotional sort of tagging, 14:37 that you were having emotional response instead of a perceptual response. 14:42 So some people who actually know a little bit more about how the brain works decided to redo the experiment. 14:50 And the only thing they changed was how they represented the survival rate and the mortality rate, 14:57 and in the new experiment, they said that nine out of ten people would survive in the first, 15:06 and one out of ten people would die in the second, and the bias towards the survival metric went away. 15:16 So that it wasn't actually in the main, the emotional tagging, 15:22 it was actually that humans are actually better at frequency than for probability. 15:31 So let's just think about this. 15:33 I have a favorite meal that I like to have on Sundays at my house and it's fresh fish and you don't want 15:39 to buy that several days in advance. 15:41 And so when I'm running errands on Sunday, 15:43 I try to drive by a grocery store or a place where I've been before that I think the fish might be good 15:50 and buy some fish on my way home. 15:52 So it's been and it's been properly chilled until I get it to my kitchen and then I can cook it. 15:59 So over time I've noticed that there are stores when I go into I often don't have fish. 16:07 So maybe once I've gotten fish there and another place I've gotten fish like five or six times in a row. 16:16 It appears that people think that way as opposed to saying, oh, the probability I get fish from this market is. 16:26 And so that since we live our lives more like on frequency basis and not on collecting all the data 16:34 and running a probability theory, it might be more natural for us to understand things presented in the way 16:42 that we run our lives. 16:43 in frequency as opposed to changing into probability. 16:47 Now that doesn't mean you can't get people to be sophisticated about both. 16:52 They're the same representation of the facts. 16:55 But if you're just asking for a quick response or you're doing a quick analysis, 16:58 it may be actually better to present data as frequency data than as probabilistic data 17:05 because that's sort of a 17:13 Because knowing where predators were or food was, 17:18 one to avoid and one to find would have been very, 17:21 very important and you probably weren't thinking of it as a risk probability but more of an experience 17:29 that would be that way. 17:31 And so I think that gives you a little bit of an example of how it's completely counterintuitive to expect 17:37 that someone would interpret 90 % and 9 out of 10 as different, right? 17:44 But actually, it takes less training to get people to do it without having it as a frequency and 17:51 then it would be having it as a probability. 17:53 And so if you're trying to have safe, reliable, quick, resilient performance, 17:59 then it's important to match human capability and we always don't understand what our capability is. 18:06 This is the end of part one of our interview with Cynthia Noll, NASA technical fellow for human factors. 18:15 Stay tuned for part two of where Cynthia will detail more of the myths and misconceptions 18:19 of how the human brain works. 18:22 For a transcript and to catch all other episodes, visit nasa .gov slash podcasts. 18:27 While you're there, check out our other podcasts like Houston we have a podcast, Curious Universe, 18:32 and Oniverso Corioso de la NASA. 18:34 As always, thanks for listening. 18:35 This 18:51 is an official NASA Podcast.
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دربارهی این قسمت Dr. Cynthia Null, NASA Technical Fellow for Human Factors, discusses how understanding human capabilities and limitations can help engineers reduce risk and design safer, more successful missions from the start.
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